M A N U S C R I P T A C C E P T E D ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
3 cost of capital, they do not consider the connection between the cost of capital and changes to market microstructure information. Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) , Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) , Botosan (2000) , Brennan and Tamarowski (2000) showed that the improved disclosure of accounting information led to a reduction in information asymmetry that decreased the cost of capital. This is confirmed empirically, as Hail and Leuz (2007) and Li (2010) showed that the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards by European firms led to a reduction in the cost of capital. Moreover, Hail and Leuz (2009) showed that when firms cross-list and improved disclosure there was a corresponding reduction in the cost of capital. However, when firms cross-list and do not increase their level of disclosure, changes to the cost of capital were not evident. We extend this literature by examining how improved trading information, that is provided by a stock exchange can influence the cost of capital.
In Easley and O'Hara (2004) , a more generalised information structure is examined to that assumed in the studies above. In particular, Easley and O'Hara (2004) extended the information structure to include microstructure information such as trading information.
They showed that the quality and quantity of both accounting and trading information influences the cost of capital. In empirical work, Easley et al (2002) showed that, as informed trading increases, expected returns and, therefore, the cost of capital rise. As an example, they showed that a 10% rise in information-based trading leads to a 2.5% rise in the cost of capital.

4
Evidence that the quality of trading information is influenced by the trading methods of securities is provided by Pagano and Roell (1990) , who compared price formation in a dealer and auction market with participating informed traders. They found that the greater transparency of auction markets led to higher levels of market liquidity 2 . Meanwhile, Biais (1993) argued that dealer markets are more fragmented than auction markets because any significant pre-trade order flow information is hidden from the market. A loss of information also arises because bilateral telephone discussions in dealer markets contribute to opaqueness. This is possible as some prices are negotiated away from the electronic trading system obscuring the information available to investors. Transparency, and therefore the quality of trading information, is also lower in a dealer market because trades can be reported with a delay causing relevant price and volume information to be obscured. Moreover, both Dutta and Madhavan (1997) and Huang and Stoll (1996) demonstrated that, in a dealer market, bid-ask spreads fail to reach competitive levels, this drives a wedge between intrinsic prices and traded prices, reducing the quality of price information. In their experimental study, Bloomfield and O'Hara (1999) showed that trade disclosure increases transparency, price efficiency and price informativeness, demonstrating that market architecture has a strong impact on the quality of trading-related information.
The quality of trading information is also influenced by market structure in other ways. Madhavan (1992) showed that information aggregation, and therefore efficiency, is higher in a call auction because traders with private information are forced to compete with each other.
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Such competition erodes information asymmetry between informed and uninformed traders. Pagano and Schwartz (2003) showed that the use of call auctions raises the synchronicity of prices, indicating that information from call auctions is of a higher quality. Nimalendran and Petrella (2003) examined the performance of thinly-traded stocks on the Italian Bourse and found that market liquidity is higher in hybrid markets that combine order-driven trading with market maker participation. Crucially, however, the aforementioned studies stopped short of examining whether there was a corresponding change in the cost of capital.
We use the framework of a before-and-after-event study in the same way as Christie and Huang (1994) or Bennet and Wei (2006) , who examined the transfer of securities from one exchange to another. To capture possible changes in systematic risk caused by changes in information quality, we estimate risk using the framework of the three factor Fama-French (1993) model, which we augment with an illiquidity factor.
Specifically, we show that, following the introduction of SETSmm, there is a short term increase in stock returns for migrating firms and a corresponding increase in a range of information quality metrics. Using Fama-French risk coefficients in the pre and postmigration period, we have found that for migrating stocks there is a fall in market risk in the period following migration. Based on average costs of equity capital across UK companies, our results suggest that, on average, the market beta changes we identify lead to a reduction in the cost of equity capital of about 0.6%.
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As a robustness check, we also calculate the cost of capital in years preceding and following the change in the trading system using the implied cost of capital model introduced by Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) as well as the model proposed by Easton (2004) . These measures of risk also show that the cost of capital following migration declines for migrating companies.
Control securities not migrating to SETSmm do not experience a fall in the cost of capital.
We also find that our results are robust even after controlling for a range of factors that are commonly believed to influence the cost of capital. We examine small and large firms separately since smaller, less liquid stocks may behave differently to large firms as they are characterized by greater information asymmetry. These differences may cause diverse reactions to information asymmetry when the trading system alters. We find that small firms experience the largest reduction to risk after SETSmm is introduced.
The remainder of this paper is set out as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology we used. Section 3 discusses the link between information and the cost of capital. Section 4 sets out the data, Section 5 presents the main results, Section 6 presents some robustness tests.
Finally, Section 7 provides a summary and a conclusion to the paper.
2: Empirical Methodology.
The focus of our empirical work is to discover whether information quality improved after SETSmm was introduced and whether this led to changes in the cost of capital. In the first instance we examine whether information quality improved after SETSmm is introduced. For the two years preceding and following the introduction of SETSmm, we estimate the market M A N U S C R I P T
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7 efficiency coefficient (MEC) introduced by Hasbrouck and Schwartz (1988) which is one of the most commonly used measures of information quality. The MEC is calculated as the ratio of the variance of two-day returns (VAR R 2 DAY ) to two times the variance of one-day returns ( 2 (VAR R 1 DAY)) as follows:
When returns are formed in a frictionless market, the MEC is unity indicating an absence of intervailing effects on the return variance. A MEC greater than unity implies positive serial correlation due to the sequential dissemination of information, momentum trading and undershooting in price discovery.
We also examine the responsiveness of stock returns to fluctuations in the market portfolio return, a metric introduced by Chordia and Swaminathan (2000) . This statistic is denoted as DELAY and can be calculated as follows:
Where t i, β is the beta parameter estimate for the i th security, obtained from a Dimson (1979) aggregate coefficient regression model, based on contemporaneous and market returns lagged five periods. If there are no market frictions affecting security returns, the DELAY statistic should equal 0.5. Larger deviations from 0.5 indicate greater market frictions and larger price distortions. Black (1986) introduced the concept of noisy price adjustment, where frictions cause temporary price movements, which result in prices moving away from their intrinsic values,
causing short-run changes in return. As shown by Amihud and Mendelson (1987) , temporary price movements that are quickly reversed will introduce negative serial correlation into short horizon returns, while slow information diffusion, momentum and slow price discovery will lead to positive serial correlation. To measure the effect of temporary price movements on returns, we estimate the one-period daily serial correlation coefficient of stock returns, used previously to capture price efficiency by Bennett and Wei (2006) . If market quality improves after migration, the serial correlation coefficient should move closer to zero after the introduction of SETSmm.
Our final measure of market quality is based on the average number of zero volume days as proposed by Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) and Liu (2006) . This metric captures the loss of information that arises when securities fail to trade. As shown by the non-trading model of Lo and MacKinlay (1990) , when a security fails to trade, important information about the true intrinsic process is hidden from the market. This happens because, in the absence of a trade, the new intrinsic price is unobservable. Moreover, as suggested by Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) , thin trading can be a symptom of information scarcity, which deters investors from trading. The idea is that information changes investor expectations about price, and so provides opportunities to trade. If a new trading system reduces the frequency of zero volume days, then information quality improves, as more information about the return-generating process is relayed to the market. Higher trading activity in itself indicates increased information availability, thus incentivising investors to trade. We therefore calculate the mean number of zero volume days and consecutive zero volume days in the period before and after the introduction of SETSmm.
Next, we use the framework of the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model to measure changes in systematic risk that arise between the pre and post-SETSmm periods. Recent evidence provided by Amihud (2002) , Asparouhova et al (2010) and Hasbrouck (2010) strongly supports illiquidity risk as a priced risk characteristic. Moreover, as Amihud et al (1997) has shown trading systems influence illiquidity. We therefore augment the threefactor model with an illiquidity factor computed from the illiquidity ratio of the underlying firms.
We denote month t* as the effective month of migration. For each firm migrating to the hybrid SETSmm trading system, the following monthly asset pricing regression is estimated for months -36 to +36 of the new system. This is a procedure similar to that used previously by Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2002) to discover whether systematic risk changes in response to variations in dividend, by Lambert et al (2007) to show that better accounting information reduces the cost of capital and by Li (2010) to show that the adoption of IFRS reduced the cost of capital.
Where D t is a dummy variable that has a value of zero in the pre-change period but has a value of unity in the post-change period, r it is the monthly stock return for firm i, r mt is the monthly return to the value weighted FTSE All Share index, and r ft is the monthly return to a 1-month UK T-bill. The ) ( ft mt r r − is the market risk premium, SMB is the difference
between the return to a portfolio of small stocks and a portfolio of large stocks and is a proxy for small firm risk. HML is the difference between the returns to a portfolio of high book-tomarket stocks and a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks designed by Fama and French (1993) to capture the distressed stock effect. ILLIQ is the difference between the returns on a portfolio of high illiquidity stocks and a portfolio of low illiquidity stocks. capture changes to these factor loadings, or risks, in the post-migration period. The α i is the risk-adjusted abnormal return or alpha of firm i during the period of dealer market trading, while α ∆i is the change in abnormal return after migration to the hybrid trading system.
As a robustness check, we also estimate the implied cost of capital in the years preceding and following migration using two widely employed implied cost of capital measures 3 . In each of these models, we substitute market price and earnings forecasts from I/B/E/S into the equation and back out the cost of capital. This is the internal rate of return that equates the current stock price to the expected stream of abnormal earnings. Both models are consistent with the dividend valuation model but make different assumptions that will influence estimates of the cost of capital. The first model presented below applies the growth assumptions of Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) . In their exposition of share price value detailed in equation (4) p354, the share price comprises the capitalised value of current M A N U S C R I P T A C C E P T E D Short-term growth, therefore, has an adjustment for foregone earnings due to expected dividends paid at the end of the year 1 financial year (Proposition 1, Ohlson and JuettnerNauroth (2005) ). This makes the short-term growth rate as shown in Section 6 of Ohlson
Juettner-Nauroth p361 (eps 2 -eps 1 )/eps 1 )+r(dps 1 /eps 1 ) rather than (eps 2 -eps 1 /eps 1 ) 5 which is the long-term growth rate. These assumptions lead to their implied cost of capital formulation as shown by their adjusted equation (9) found on p359.
We employ the estimation process of Hail and Leuz (2009, p450) and dividends d it+1 per share for each security, in addition to forecasts of short-and long-term abnormal earnings growth (g ist and g ilt respectively). The growth rate g ist (proxying for short-4 If dps1=eps1, then the abnormal change in earnings is simply eps2-eps1. 5 As a result, the short-term growth rate is the long-term growth rate less r(dps t /eps t ). 6 Stock prices and analyst forecasts are measured in month seven of the fiscal year to ensure that all financial data used is publically available and reflected in prices at the time we compute the cost of capital estimates. (4) and (5) is provided in Hail and Leuz (2009, p450) .
Information and Systematic Risk
The pioneering work of Lambert et al (2007) highlighted two ways in which the quality of accounting information can influence a firm's cost of capital. Although improvements in accounting disclosure cannot alter the realised cash flows of firms, they can change the precision of expectations that investors hold regarding the distribution of cash flows. They showed that the covariance between the cash flows of different firms depends on the precision of a given firms's information. They concluded, therefore, that an improvement to 9 The model requires positive changes in forecasted earnings to yield a numerical solution. 10 As is usual and exemplified by Hail and Leuz (2007, 2009) , we estimate the implied cost of capital iteratively until we identify a rate that causes prices to be within 0.001 of its actual value.
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14 disclosure that reduces the measurement error of future cash flows will lead to a reduction in covariance and consequently the cost of capital. An effect that is not diversifiable 11 .
Lambert et al (2007) also demonstrated that "if better information reduces the amount of firm cash flow that managers appropriate for themselves, the improvements in disclosure not only increase firm price, but in general also reduce a firm's cost of capital" (p388). This indirect effect is possible because the ratio of expected cash flows to covariance shifts 12 . Moreover, they also showed that information quality can influence real investment decisions. As a result, the ratio of expected cash flows to non-diversifiable covariance risk changes, which in turn influences the cost of capital.
Within the Lambert et al (2007) per se that leads to a higher cost of capital, but rather the level of uncertainty caused by poor information quality. However, Armstrong et al (2011) showed that when markets are not fully competitive, information asymmetry re-emerges to impact the cost of capital.
O'Hara (2003), Easley and O'Hara (2004) and Hughes et al (2007) consider a more general information set that is not restricted to accounting information but also includes trading information. They argue that less informed investors recognise that they are at a disadvantage. Consequently, these investors hold fewer assets, driving down the prices of securities with high information asymmetry. The result is a reduction in the cost of capital to compensate for these costs. This suggests that trading information such as published prices, volume and the speed that trading information is presented to the market can also influence the amount of information asymmetry and the precision of information.
What all these studies cumulatively indicate is that improved information disclosure increases the element of return variation resulting from firm-specific information, (see for example Roll (1988) ). A consequence of firm-specific information, becoming more important, is that the covariance between one firm and another decreases. This leads to a reduction in the covariance between a stock and the market. As a result market risk declines.
When a trading system changes and the quality of trading information improves, there is less uncertainty about current firm values. This allows investors to differentiate more effectively between firms, facilitating better asset allocation decisions. The move from SEAQ to
SETSmm improves the quality of trading information. As previously noted, prices on the
dealer system SEAQ are less transparent than those on SETSmm, as a high proportion of trades take place after telephone negotiations in dealer markets. This prevents other traders from knowing about the trade until after it has been reported. This, in turn, prevents investors from tracing out the demand and supply curves of each stock prior to a transaction. Board and Sutcliffe (1996) showed that over half of all SEAQ trades took place through telephone negotiation, which implied considerable opaqueness. In contrast, auction systems like SETSmm allow investors to view the most competitive buy and sell orders. This helps them to determine the buying and selling intensity at each price so that the demand and supply curves for each stock can be identified.
Another feature of SEAQ which reduces the amount of trading information disclosed to the market concerns reporting delays. SEAQ allows trade reporting delays of up to five days for large trades, which means that other market participants are not informed that a trade has taken place or at what price until the reporting delay has elapsed. In contrast, all auction trades are reported immediately on SETSmm 13 . During a reporting delay informed traders are able to maintain an information advantage over the uninformed until information about the trade is published. This contributes to elevated levels of information asymmetry which investors expect to be compensated for via the cost of capital.
The change to a more effective trading mechanism such as SETSmm can also increase the level of competition within a market by encouraging greater competition between traders. An 13 Trades made through designated market makers on SETSmm are governed by special publication rules and are less opaque than on SETSmm. Transactions of 4 x NMS (Normal Market Size) need not be reported until either 80% of the trade is offset or the end of the trading day arrives, whichever is first. Trades larger than 75 x NMS have an extended publication delay of three days or 90% of the trade. NMS is approximately the median size trade.
17 increase in competition reduces the impact of information asymmetry on the cost of capital, as suggested by Armstrong et al (2011) . Changes to the trading system that reduce nontrading will also lead to an improvement in the quality of information and reduced uncertainty.
Cost of capital adjustments will be observable through changes in market risk because better quality information increases the role of firm-specific news as the precision of information increases. As these changes take place, the covariances between firms decrease, causing a reduction in the covariance between a particular firm and the market. We therefore expect to observe that changes to the trading system that improve the quality of information should lead to a reduction in market risk. We do not envisage there being changes to the SMB or HML components, as these premiums reflect a firm size and a distressed firm component that should not be influenced by changes in the information structure. Improvements to information quality will also lead to improvements in market liquidity if the former are widespread. However, we do not envisage that market illiquidity will be impacted by a change in information quality after the introduction of SETSmm, as these changes only influence a specific segment of the market.
4: Data and Summary Information
The 14 AIM stocks, unlike main market stocks, are subject to a nominated advisor regime rather than an FCA sponsor regime as they are exchange regulated securities, not EU regulated securities. Unlike main market companies which have to provide financial accounts for at least three years, AIM stocks do not have to provide a minimum financial history. 15 A security becomes eligible for trading on SETSmm only if its liquidity has been proven sufficient to warrant migration to SETSmm. Only a small number of firms migrated from SEAQ to SETSmm in this way, and during some quarterly reviews no migrations were announced. Since the LSE became Mifid compliant, SETSmm became a segment of SETS, the main trading system. 16 In November 2007, stocks were still traded on SETSmm, but the system was renamed SETS. Consequently, the last two batches were transfers from SEAQ to the SETSmm segment of SETS. ILLIQ is an illiquidity factor that aims to capture how illiquidity differences influence return performance. For each stock we construct the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio by calculating the previous year's annual average of the daily absolute return to volume ratio. This value is multiplied by 10 6 and scaled by the market ratio. Days of zero volume are excluded when calculating the illiquidity ratio. In common with Amihud (2002) and later applications using the illiquidity ratio, the sample excludes stocks from any year which does not provide return or volume data for at least 200 of its days. We divide the sample into three groups based on this illiquidity ratio (high, medium and low). We then create a monthly illiquidity, mimicking factor ILLIQ as the average return on the high illiquidity portfolio, minus the average return on the low illiquidity portfolio.
5: Results
In Table 2 we report mean, median and standard deviation summary information for the stocks in our sample. Return, r m -r f , SMB and HML are the monthly stock returns, the monthly market risk premiums and the SMB and HML return premiums, respectively. MV is the market value in 000's. M/B is the market-to-book ratio. Leverage is the ratio of debt to equity. Asset Growth is the change in asset values that take place between one year and M A N U S C R I P T
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another and captures the growth rate of the firm. ROA is the return on assets, Div Payout is the ratio of dividends to earnings and Volatility is the monthly return volatility of the stock.
Price is the average price used in the implied cost of capital models. EPS Yr1 and EPS Yr2 are the I/B/E/S forecasts of future earnings used to obtain the implied cost of capital estimates. The value g s is the short-term growth rate used in the implied cost of capital models, g lOJ is the long-term growth rate used in the Ohlson Juettner-Nauroth model (expected inflation rate) and g lE is the long-term growth rate used in the Easton model (based on the Yr 1 growth rate).
In Table 3 , we report five and ten-day cumulative abnormal returns following the migration announcement. Additionally, we report pre-and post-SETSmm values for average volume, market adjusted volume 17 and the illiquidity ratio. These have been calculated using the periods 36 to 12 months preceding the event period and 12 to 36 months following the event period. Both the five-and ten-day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR 5 and CAR 10 in Table   3 ) indicate an increase in returns after the announcement that securities are to migrate to
SETSmm. An increase in short-term returns at the time of the announcement is consistent with a fall in the cost of capital 18 . We also find that volume and market-adjusted volume rise in the period following the introduction of SETSmm. This is reflected in a reduction of the average illiquidity ratio from 0.375 prior to the introduction of SETSmm to 0.136 afterwards.
Information Quality Changes
17 We market-adjust volume by subtracting average FTSE 100 security volume. 18 An unexpected fall in the cost of capital leads to a rise in the share price, as future investor cash flows are deflated by a smaller discount rate. For the current share price to equal a set of discounted cash flows that are larger (due to the fall in the discount rate), the current share price must rise. The effect of this increase in the share price will lead to an increase in returns until the process of adjustment has been completed.
Next, in Table 4 Table 5 . This model is estimated over the 36-month period before and after migration and is therefore estimated over different calendar dates for the sample stocks. This allows us to isolate the impact of changes in risk, due to an alteration in the trading system, separately from the changes that arise due to the time period being studied.
Cost of Capital Changes
The Table 5 , respectively. Panel B shows that the average Juettner-Nauroth implied cost of capital estimate is 13.89% at three years, 16.51% at two years and 13.69% at one year prior to migration, respectively. During the year of migration, the average cost of capital is 13.17%. In the year following migration, the average cost of capital falls to 11.97% and remains below Yr 0 levels three years after migration. As a check on the above, we also estimate the same implied cost of capital models using only stocks that provide cost of capital estimates in Yr 1, 0 and Yr -1. We then measure the 
Firm Size
An important consideration when altering the trading system is the effect that these changes can have on the performance of different classes of securities. This was highlighted by Muscarella and Piwowar (2001) and Nimalendran and Petrella (2003) , who showed that when a trading system changes, the benefits of such a change may be dependent on firm liquidity. Muscarella and Piwowar (2001) showed that in the case of the Paris Bourse migration of securities from a call auction to a continuous auction system, led to a rise in value of liquid firms but also a fall in value for illiquid firms. Easley et al (1996) have also argued that smaller stocks are characterized by greater informational asymmetries. 19 Our estimates are likely to be different, as the Ohlson Juettner-Nauroth model assumes that long-term growth is equal to the expected inflation rate, while Easton assumes that long-term growth in abnormal earnings is based on the relevant year 1 growth rates. Differences in the way long-term growth rates are derived are likely to lead to differences in the implied cost of capital estimates.
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In Table 6 we report the Fama-French model estimated separately for migrating small, medium and large firms, and in Table 7 we report implied cost of capital estimates for the three groups based on firm size. Table 6 shows that in the pre-SETSmm period, the mean beta of all size groupings is significant and positive. Small firms have the largest market beta (1.0224) and the smallest beta is associated with medium firms (0.9137). The largest changes in beta are associated with small firms as their average change in beta is -0.1554. The medium-sized firms do not experience a significant reduction in market beta, while for large firms the average beta falls by 0.1072 (only significant at a 10% level). This suggests that small firms benefited most from a reduction in market risk as a result of changes to the trading system. The average market risk premium to firms during this period is about 5%, so a reduction in beta of this magnitude equates to a decline in the cost of capital of about 0.78% for small firms. Table 7 also shows that the risk of firms is related to their size. In both the Juettner-Nauroth and Easton models, we find that the magnitude of risk estimates are related to firm size. 
Control stocks
As a first robustness test, we take a sample of non-migrating securities from those stocks on SEAQ that were never transferred to SETSmm 20 . For these stocks we should observe no change in the cost of capital because trading information for these stocks did not improve.
Using these control stocks, we estimate the information quality measures presented in Table   4 and find no indication that information quality improved in the post-SETSmm period (unreported). Results from the estimation of the Fama-French model are presented in Table 8 and show that there are no obvious changes to risk estimates in the post-SETSmm period 21 .
Other factors influencing cost of capital changes
The cost of capital of a firm can change for reasons unrelated to the quality of information.
To demonstrate more fully that our results are not driven by unrelated influences on the cost of capital, we estimate the following regression model: the dependent variable CC is the cost of capital and is either the beta from the Fama-French model or the implied cost of capital from the Ohlson Juettner-Nauroth model or the Easton model. For each security, we obtain estimates using the period three years prior and subsequent to SETSmm migration. For each stock there are, therefore, seven observations, despite the fact that the calendar years will be different across stocks because migration to SETSmm occurred at different times. The
Difference-in-Difference model we estimate is described below. 20 We match to each security on SETSmm a security that is on SEAQ. To make an appropriate match we choose a SEAQ security that is from the same industry and most similar in size. 21 We do notice that, as for the migrating sample, the SMB beta does fall in the post-SETSmm period. This suggests that the fall in the SMB that we observed for migrating stocks is not due to the introduction of SETSmm. SETSmm is a dummy variable that takes a value of 0 if firms are control securities but has a value of unity if stocks are SETSmm stocks. The coefficient associated with this variable will determine whether migrating stocks have a higher or lower cost of capital to control stocks.
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Time is a dummy variable that has a value of 0 if the cost of capital measure is estimated prior to the stock moving to SETSmm, but has a value of unity otherwise 22 . This indicates whether the cost of capital across all stocks is higher or lower in the post-SETSmm period.
SETSmm*Time has a value of 0, but if the stock migrates to SETSmm and is observed in the post-SETSmm period, it has a value of unity. This is the key variable as it will show whether the cost of capital estimate is higher or lower for SETSmm stocks in the post-SETSmm period compared to the control firms. For our analysis to be correct, this must be negatively signed, indicating that SETSmm securities had a lower cost of capital in the post-SETSmm period.
To allow other factors to influence the cost of capital we also include a range of control variables. The risk of a security is positively influenced by its capital structure, so we include a variable called Leverage which is the debt-to-equity ratio of the firm. We include Asset Growth, which is the change in total asset values between yr t+1 and yr t to capture the growth strategy of the firm as this may influence its risk. We include the Return on Assets (ROA) as a measure of performance. To capture the influence of the firm's payout policy on the cost of 22 For control stocks this variable equals the corresponding value of its counterpart.
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27 capital, we include the dividend payout (Div Payout) ratio of firms. Ret Volatility is the return volatility of a firm's stock return and reflects the degree of precision investors face when forming expectations. We also include the market return (Market) to capture the current state of the economy along with the risk free return (r f ). Since the industry a firm belongs to can also influence the cost of capital, we also include a set of 23 different industry dummies (IND) to capture industry influences (unreported for brevity).
The results from this panel regression along with p values for each variable are presented in Table 9 . The results show that SETSmm stocks have a higher cost of capital than control stocks. In the post-SETSmm period, the cost of capital is higher. However, for stocks that migrate to SETSmm, the cost of capital is lower, indicating that even after we control for a whole range of factors that are known to influence the cost of capital, we still find that in the post-SETSmm period the cost of capital is lower for SETSmm securities.
Overall, we have shown that a change in the trading system can be highly beneficial to firms that migrate. One key benefit that we are the first to highlight is that migration to an improved trading system can lead to a reduction in systematic risk, as liquidity and the informativeness of prices improves. We provide the first empirical evidence to show that the transmission mechanism for such changes occurs through a reduction in systematic risk, as initially suggested by Easley and O'Hara (2004) . Moreover, we find that risk reductions appear to be greatest for the smallest and least liquid firms in the sample.
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Summary and Conclusions
Improved information disclosure increases the element of return variation derived from firmspecific information. Consequently, the return covariance between one firm and another decreases, which, in turn, reduces the covariance between a stock and the market portfolio, leading to an overall decline in market risk (Roll (1988) ). We examine whether the cost of capital changed for firms after they migrated to SETSmm. Such changes are possible because
SETSmm is an example of a more transparent trading system that improves the quality of trading information provided to the market. As such, it should play an important role in reducing information asymmetry between traders and increasing the precision of information.
We find that after stocks move to SETSmm, they experience an improvement in information quality as shown in our estimation of a range of information quality metrics before and after the introduction of SETSmm. We then use the framework of the Fama-French model (1993) and implied cost of capital estimates from Ohlson Juettner-Narouth (2005) and Easton (2004) to show that the cost of capital for migrating firms fell in the three years after they migrated to SETSmm. We show a decline in the market risk of firms measured by market beta in the post-SETSmm period but no corresponding change for a group of SEAQ securities (control securities) that do not migrate to the new system. We find that our results are highly robust, given our inclusion of a regression model, which controls for other factors that may alter the cost of capital. Using this regression model, we find that SETSmm securities still experience a fall in the cost of capital in the post-SETSmm period. is the market risk premium, SMB is the difference between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and a portfolio of large stocks and is a proxy for small firm risk. HML is the difference between the returns on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks, ILLIQ is the return to a high illiquidity portfolio less the return to a low illiquidity portfolio. Coefficients b -i ,s -i , h -i and l -i are the factor loadings or betas of firm i, estimated using information from t-36 to t-1 of migration and therefore capture the systematic risk of the firm in the pre-SETSmm period. The coefficients b ∆i , s ∆i ,h ∆i and l ∆i capture changes to risk post-SETSmm. The α i and α ∆i are pre-and post-SETSmm risk-adjusted abnormal returns. Median is the median coefficient value and the p-value is the probability value. The implied cost of capital estimates using the Juettner-Nauroth (2005) D t is a dummy variable that has a value of zero in the pre-change period but has a value of unity in the post-change period, r it is the monthly stock return for firm i, r mt is the monthly return to the value-weighted FTSE All Share index, and r ft is the monthly return to a onemonth UK T-bill. The ) ( ft mt r r − is the market risk premium, SMB is the difference between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and a portfolio of large stocks and is a proxy for small firm risk. HML is the difference between the returns on a portfolio of high book-to market stocks and a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks, ILLIQ is the return to a high illiquidity portfolio less the return to a low illiquidity portfolio. ab r is the average abnormal return to securities. Coefficients b -i ,s -i , h -i and l -i are the factor loadings, or betas, of firm i estimated using information from t-36 to t-1 of migration and therefore capture the systematic risk of the firm during the dealer market period. The coefficients b ∆i , s ∆i ,h ∆i and l ∆i capture changes to risk in the post-migration period as reflected in the period t=0 to t+36 after migration. The α i is the risk-adjusted abnormal return or alpha of firm i during the period of dealer market trading while α ∆i is the change in abnormal return after migration to the hybrid trading system. is the market risk premium, SMB is the difference between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and a portfolio of large stocks. HML is the difference between the returns on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks, ILLIQ is the return to a high illiquidity portfolio, less the return to a low illiquidity portfolio. Coefficients b -i ,s -i , h -i and l -i are the factor loadings or betas of firm i estimated using information from t-36 to t-1 of migration and therefore capture the systematic risk of the firm in the pre-SETSmm period. The coefficients b ∆i , s ∆i ,h ∆i and l ∆i capture changes to risk in the post-SETSmm period as reflected in the period t=0 to t+36 after migration. The α i and α ∆ is the risk-adjusted abnormal return (ab r) or alpha of firm i during the two periods. Median is the median coefficient value and the p-value is the probability value. The implied cost of capital estimates using the Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model and the Easton (2005) model are presented in panels B and C, respectively. In panel B and C, Yr is the year relative to the introduction of SETSmm for each security. ∆ =1,0 and ∆+1,-1 are the cost of capital changes associated securities between these years, t statistics are provided in parenthesis below. 
